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TROTTER REVIEW

“Separatist City”: The Mandela,
Massachusetts (Roxbury) Movement and the
Politics of Incorporation, Self-Determination,
and Community Control, 1986–1988
Zebulon V. Miletsky and Tomás González 1

"We didn't create this area, we just described it. The city of Boston is so incredibly
segregated, it was easy to divide. "
—Andrew Jones2
“Being part of Boston used to be OK,
When the city used to allocate money our way.
Now all that's changed and it's plain to see,
That the city only cares about property . . .
Let Boston see what it's got to see,
Mandela, Massachusetts, is the place to be.”
—“Mandela,” Massachusetts rap song; lyrics by Andrew Jones 3
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The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Jeremy Bingham, an undergraduate student at
Northeastern University studying space and place and their role in the contestation of society and culture under Tim Cresswell,
professor of history and international affairs.
2 (Kennedy, 1990: 124)
3 Provided by Curtis Davis of GRIP.
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November 4, 2016, marks 30 years since the historic referendum in which
close to 50,000 citizens of Boston living in or near the predominantly Black area of
“Greater Roxbury” voted on whether the area should leave Boston and incorporate
as a separate municipality to be named in honor of former South African president
Nelson and Winnie Mandela, or remain a part of Boston. The new community,
what planners called “Greater Roxbury,” would have included wards in much or all
of the neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester, Mattapan, Jamaica Plain, the
Fenway, the South End, and what was then known as Columbia Point. Although it
was defeated by a 3-to-1 margin in 1986, the measure was raised again in 1988,
with a different organizing strategy that spoke to the more turbulent climate of the
late 1980s. This campaign included an expanded focus on issues of gang violence,
drug abuse, and other forms of lawlessness that plagued the Black community.
This attempt, too, went down in defeat. Conceived a mere 12 years after courtordered school desegregation in Boston, Mandela symbolized in many ways
attempts to address equity issues that were never completely resolved after the
school desegregation crisis of the 1970s.
As Pierre Clavel writes in Activists in City Hall: The Progressive Response
to the Reagan Era in Boston and Chicago, “They asked Flynn to hold a plebiscite
in Roxbury on the question, and when he refused, gathered the five thousand
signatures necessary to put the question on the ballot as a nonbinding referendum.
Their success in getting the signatures in August, three months before the
November election, apparently took both the city administration and the black
leadership by surprise.” (Clavel, 2010, 81)
As Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly write in a critical piece on Mandela that
appeared in Radical America, “The separation proposal—technically a non-binding
proposal to ‘de-annex and reincorporate’ Roxbury, which was until 1868 an
independent town—whipped up a storm of controversy. Boston city officials
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damned it as ‘economically preposterous and at worst, a program of racial
separation.’ The Greater Roxbury Incorporation Project (GRIP), sponsors of the
Mandela initiative, maintained, ‘We want land control because land control is the
key to self-determination.’” As Kennedy and Tilly argue, “The proposal rekindled
a debate that has simmered in US black communities for over a hundred years. Can
the black community (or any other community of color) better achieve well being
by assimilation into the white society, or by establishing community control over
development?”(Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 23)
Andrew Jones stated about Mandela, “We feel that we have a ‘colonial
relationship’ with the city of Boston; we feel that the city of Boston has treated us
like second-class citizens and we’re fighting for basic rights of citizenship.”
(WGBH, 1986) Much of the ideological impetus behind Mandela came from the
dialogues of the 1960s and the Black Power era which advocated for selfdetermination and community control. As Kennedy, Gastón, and Tilly write, “In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, militant Black leaders—including Malcolm X, Roy
Innis, and Stokely Carmichael—compared the Black liberation struggle in the
United States with anticolonial struggles around the world. A number of radical
economists developed the analogy.” They continue: “If community control can
help poor Blacks empower themselves and alter some of the 'colonial' economic
mechanisms that marginalize them, then in the long run the community control
strategy may offer a great deal of promise for economic development.” (Kennedy
et al., 1990)
As they point out, “William Tabb, writing in 1970, pointed out that 'the
economic relations of the ghetto to white America closely parallel [the relations]
between third world nations and the industrially advanced countries.' Tabb
explained that like the typical developing country, the Black community has low
income per capita; has a small middle class, limited entrepreneurship, and an
internal market too underdeveloped to support much local business; faces a low
price and limited demand for its chief 'export'—unskilled and semi-skilled labor;
shows high internal demand for expensive 'imports'—consumer goods such as cars,
televisions, designer clothes; and experiences low rates of savings, investment and
productivity growth. Tabb concluded that 'internal colonialism is an apt description
of the place Blacks have held and continue to hold in our country.' All of these
characteristics describe Roxbury, whose per capita income in 1979 was less than
two-thirds that of Boston as a whole. (Kennedy et al., 1990)
Very much in the tradition of Black Power–era groups such as the Republic
of New Africa (RNA), which was founded in 1968 as an American social
movement based in the ideology of Black Nationalism, it had as one if its main
goals the creation of an independent African American–majority country situated
in the southeastern United States. The RNA attempted to lay claim to an
3

independent Black republic created out of the southern states of South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, which were considered “subjugated
lands.” The RNA proposed that these lands separate from the larger United States
to function as “a government in exile” for Black Americans and the basis for a new
Black nation. Much of the idea for this was based on Tanzania president Julius
Nyerere’s “ujamaa” concept of self-government and cooperative economics.
(Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick, 1970)
As Kennedy, Tilly, and Gastón further point out, “Tanzania's Julius Nyerere
has made a number of observations that seem relevant to the struggle to develop
Roxbury. ‘A country, or a village, or a community cannot be developed,' Nyerere
argued. 'It can only develop itself. For real development means the development,
the growth, of people.'” (Kennedy et al., 1990).
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While scholars and journalists have documented the story of Mandela fairly
well, many people in Boston have either never heard of it, vaguely remember it, or
never understood it in the first place. Others would just as soon forget it and are
happy to never bring it up again. Since the Mandela campaign did happen, this
article simply seeks to provide some context for the initiative, to tell the story, and
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to organize the vast amount of media coverage on Mandela, despite its relative
obscurity. With this upcoming inauspicious anniversary, it seems that things have
come full circle in 30 years, and therefore it is an opportune time to revisit a
relatively misunderstood chapter in the city’s history.
This article examines the history of Mandela in Boston and the secession
movement that arose in Roxbury in the mid-1980s and manifested in referenda to
support the creation of a new separate Black-majority city. Also considered are the
economic development implications that would have come with the separate city
and how that issue figured into the political debate, resultant referenda, and their
popularity, or lack thereof, even among many African Americans. Additionally, we
note the concerns raised by prominent members of the African-American faith
community. The main criticism of the Mandela idea was an essential question
asked by many—how would they "go it alone" economically? By examining the
rhetoric of that debate, we explore the politics around the movement, taking into
consideration the idea of “de-annexing” or incorporation that galvanized the
community at a time when gang violence and the crack epidemic threatened to
dismantle many of the gains of the 1960s and 1970s. The backdrop was very much
Reagan’s America, where social services were being cut and hip-hop was the
medium of expression in the streets.
Ultimately, we hope to force a reconsideration of the spirit of Mandela—
community control, land control, and control over one’s destiny. While the media
and the position often tried to paint Mandela as a separatist or secession issue, its
advocates insisted it was very much rooted in “land control.” As former city
councilor Chuck Turner notes, “The legacy of the Mandela movement was that the
issue was to have the community having an authoritative voice in that, in that
process…” (Turner interview with authors, 2016) Without question the idea of
Mandela fanned racial, political flames and awakened the civic imagination as it
drew national media attention. Whether people agreed or not, it intrigued the
nation. Many observers were interested in the outcome, although almost all of the
media attention was skeptical about the initiative’s ability to address the problems
its founders claimed it was designed to ameliorate.
Moving beyond discussions of the failures of the referenda or the lack of
viability of the initial idea, it is crucial to focus on the fact that it was a radical idea
that pushed the city and the administration of Mayor Ray Flynn to demonstrate its
commitment to economic development in Roxbury and to the Black constituency
that had overwhelmingly voted for Mel King, Flynn’s opponent in the 1983
general election. By the mid-1980s, “land control” was the reigning civil rights
issue for the Black community in Boston. At the height of the anti-apartheid
movement among Black Americans nationally, “Mandela” symbolized the struggle
for power in the 1980s, both metaphorically and actually. Additionally, we argue
6

that the historic step of extending eminent domain to the community-based
organization Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), long hailed as a model
of community organizing and empowerment, would not have been possible
without the Mandela initiative, which represented a more extreme alternative in the
minds of Mayor Flynn and the populace at large. Finally, we suggest beneath the
Mandela initiative lay groups like the Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority
(GRNA) that were also engaging in campaigns to assert community-based control.
Spearheaded by two outsiders to Boston, Andrew Jones and Curtis Davis,
the idea split the community, with people on both sides supporting or actively
working against it. "Separatist City" was the somewhat reactionary label that the
media gave to this ambitious but ultimately failed attempt at Black selfdetermination. Overall, that media attention was skeptical of the idea of Mandela,
though there were exceptions.
It is important to mention at the outset that the Mandela referendum, had it
passed, would not have created a separate city outright. It would merely have
made the suggestion to the legislature that this was something a majority of the
voters wanted, which the legislature could have then taken into consideration and
could have acted upon.
As Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly write in “The Mandela Campaign: A
Summary,” “The Boston white establishment reacted with a self-righteous anger
born of wounded liberalism. Boston's leading daily newspaper, The Boston Globe,
in a near-hysterical outpouring unprecedented since the 1970s racial violence
associated with busing, published by our count at least twelve negative articles on
Mandela in the three weeks preceding the election. The articles included two
editorials and two signed columns, charging Mandela advocates with
"deceitfulness," "negativism, untruths, and confusion," making "loud, angry
charges," being "hostile and divisive," and "promot[ing] racial segregation." The
Globe, along with other opponents of Mandela, persisted in calling the
reincorporation proposal "secession," a term that GRIP rejected. The Phoenix,
Boston's leading alternative weekly, joined the Globe in deploring Mandela.”
(Kennedy and Tilly, 23)
James Jennings, professor emeritus of urban and environmental policy and
planning at Tufts University, recalls: “There was intense debate which I always felt
was healthy because again intense debate, if it’s within the framework of economic
democracy and social justice, then, you know, the synthesis of that only moves
society forward, in my opinion. So there was a lot of intense debate. But again,
functional, because we have had that debate before. And now we can have a
debate about what makes sense for us.” (Jennings, interview with authors, 2016)
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Review of the Mandela Coverage and Literature
There is more scholarship on the Mandela movement than one might think.
These works seem to generally fall into two categories: work tied to the
community and work done outside of the community. While the former was
carried out by scholars who had ties to the community and, in some cases, were
tangentially involved, the latter was produced by professional scholars of various
disciplines with few connections to community institutions and without much input
from the primary actors about whom they were writing.
Besides these two broad and rather simplistic categories of scholarship on
Mandela, it’s also important to consider the work on urban studies and community
development in Boston more broadly and identify useful models in organizing the
literature to better situate the story of Mandela. King, in his seminal book Chain of
Change, cites three stages of political development in the Black community’s quest
for liberation. Although his formulation related to politics, it is possible to extend it
to the larger scholarship on African Americans in Boston. As such, it may be
useful as a way to roughly organize the work on African Americans in Boston
beyond the simplistic binary notion of work that emanates from outside Boston’s
Black community versus that which is more organic or “home grown.” This
theoretical framework can be helpful here in not only better understanding the
Mandela movement, but in attempting to categorize the various “stages” or broad
“categories” of scholarly work on African Americans in Boston along these same
lines.
For scholarship produced by those without ties to the community, one could
best describe it in a way as being akin to what King characterized as the “service
stage” of the Black liberation struggle in Boston. He writes, “The Service Stage
was a time during which the community of color was dependent on the ‘good will’
of the white society for access to its goods, its services, its jobs, housing and
schools. Black people were expected to trust that the system would work for
them—eventually.” (King, 1981, 6)
Following this line of thought logically, other work on Mandela could also
be said to fall into the “service stage”—as well as the following two stages—the
“organization stage” and, finally, the “institution building” stage. King writes,
“The Organizing Stage encompasses most of the 1960’s. The moment Black
People began to awaken to their own potential to state, ‘We are deserving,’ the
process of organizing ourselves began. No longer were we content to wait. We
demanded our rights.” (King, 1981, 27) Under this rubric might fall much of the
critical knowledge building that was acquired by the Black press, which kicked
open doors in the 1960s to access the print and broadcast newsrooms of Boston
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and create an army of Black reporters intent on being able to “shape the story” of
the Black experience in the city.
One thinks of a Sarah-Ann Shaw, first female African American television
reporter in Boston, who grew up in an “organizing family.” Her mother worked
alongside the selfless Melnea Cass, and Shaw's father, who was active in the
Roxbury Democratic Club, took her to lectures as a child. In high school, she
became involved with the NAACP Youth Movement. Increasingly involved in
community activities, Shaw worked with St. Mark's Social Center and as a member
of the Boston Action Group (BAG), one of Boston’s most important and effective
civil rights groups. In 1968, she became involved with Ray Richardson's “Say
Brother” public affairs show on WGBH-TV and, in 1969, was hired by WBZ-TV
as a reporter.
An initial article from the now defunct Roxbury Community News, edited by
Mary Ann Crayton, is what actually motivated the Globe to write about the
Mandela referenda in a more nuanced way. Jennings recalls that “the Roxbury
Community News had two or three important pieces on what was happening on the
ground, and I think that’s what motivated the Globe to say, ‘Hey, wait a second.
We have to write about this as well, other than calling people separatist.’”
(Jennings, interview with authors, 2016)
The long-standing Black newspaper, the Bay State Banner, deserves special
mention for its extensive coverage of Mandela. Melvin B. Miller, editor of the
Banner, historically known to fall more on the conservative side of such issues,
arranged for a balanced interpretation—one that could even be characterized as
positive. Much of the coverage’s quality stems from the devoted reporting of
Banner scribe Brian Wright O’Connor, who kept the record on Mandela.
There were many others who provided solid and consistent coverage of the
Mandela story, including Callie Crossley, Carmen Fields, and Marcus Jones, all
formerly of the 10 O’Clock News, WGBH; Beth Deare and Robin Washington of
“Say Brother,” WGBH; and Luix Overbea of The Christian Science Monitor all
provided coverage.
King describes the last stage in Boston’s political development as the
“Institution Building” stage. He explains, “The confidence and experience gained
through the organizing process prompted us to begin thinking differently about
what we wanted to gain. Just as a person grows up and realizes that no one else
can provide what you want as well as you can, because you really are the only
person who can know what you want, Black people began to realize that just
getting access to the existing institutions was not the best way to meet our needs.”
(King, 1981, 151) In this “institution building” stage, Boston has developed what
could be called an “indigenous” scholarship infrastructure, growing its own
scholars in the tradition of Black and Ethnic Studies, where many scholars
9

(including scholars of color and/or allies) have either come out of the civil rights
and Black Power movements of the 1960s or are members of the post–civil rights
generation. Their work could most adequately be called the fruit of the “institution
building” stage.
Much of the scholarship on Mandela falls into the “institution building”
stage—work that was nurtured from within a community framework, utilized
community sources, and reflected a concern about community roots. Studies
falling under this heading were produced by entities like the Trotter Institute at the
University of Massachusetts Boston—by authors with ties to its College of Public
and Community Service. The strongest work by far written on Mandela came out
of that intellectual community through the scholarship of Jennings, Marie
Kennedy, the late Mauricio Gastón, and Chris Tilly. In contrast, like much of the
mainstream coverage, which was acerbically negative, the secondary literature on
Mandela from outside the community largely mirrored the skepticism expressed in
the mainstream media.
Authors whose larger work had a wider focus and who may have devoted a
page or two to Mandela often characterize it as an idea that was more symbolic in
nature and essentially as a failure. A notable exception is the doctoral dissertation
“The Sociology of a City in Transition: Boston 1980–2000” by Donald A. Gillis, a
sociologist who spent most of his career working for the city of Boston in the
mayoral administrations of Ray Flynn. While Mandela was not his main focus, the
study does offer an analysis of how race influenced Boston.
“Indigenous” scholarship that falls under both the “insider” column and
aspires to that higher, nobler status of “institution building” would certainly
include the work of King and Jennings. Their work, in both The Politics of Black
Empowerment: The Transformation of Black Activism in Urban America (1992)
and From Access to Power: Black Politics in Boston (1986), devotes a great deal of
attention to Mandela, and more important to the urban conditions that gave rise to a
call for incorporation. In fact, this partnership and ongoing collaboration has
produced the highest order of scholarly studies on Boston’s Black community.
Scholarship on Roxbury and the Black community in Boston during the critical
movement years of the 1960s to the present owe a great deal to these foundational
texts. The work of King and Jennings provides the penultimate examples of the
“insider” work that also falls in the category of “institution building” as it applies
to the scholarship on Boston’s Black liberation movement. The many works of
Robert C. Hayden, longtime historian of Black Boston, must also be noted. Hayden
“is a historian, author, and educator, who has contributed to African American
historiography for thirty-five years. He is the author, co-author, and editor of
nineteen books and special publications in the field… From 1974 to 1983, he wrote
a weekly column, “Boston’s Black History,” for the Bay State Banner newspaper
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in Boston.” (Historymakers.com) His steadfast column resulted in a book that is
still the standard for Black history in Boston, African Americans in Boston: More
Than 350 Years. Other texts by “allies” include James Green’s Taking History to
Heart: The Power of the Past in Building Social Movements and the critical
volume edited by Mike Davis, Steven Hiatt, Marie Kennedy, Susan Ruddick, and
Michael Sprinker, Fire in the Hearth: The Radical Politics of Place in America.4
Radical America, a left-wing political magazine established in 1967 and
published out of Somerville, Massachusetts, brought together the leading voices on
the questions raised here regarding Boston and Roxbury for a special issue on
“Race & Community Control, Media, Politics” in the fall of 1986. All combined,
these essays played an important role in deconstructing how race was understood
in Boston in the mid-1980s. Paul Buhle and Mari Jo Buhle, who were activists in
Students for a Democratic Society, founded the magazine. An article, “The
Mandela Campaign: An Overview,” by Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly, was an
abridged version of a longer article that appeared as “A City Called Mandela:
Secession and the Struggle for Community Control in Boston,” published in the
spring 1987 issue of The North Star. Another article, coming from a more
independent point of view, “Africa in Boston: A Critical Analysis of Mandela,
Massachusetts,” written by Monty Neill, appeared in The New Enclosures in 1990.
A book chapter by Nancy Haggard-Gilson, published in 1995 and titled “Boston's
Mandela Referendum: Urban Nationalism and Economic Dependence,” was
included in The Changing Racial Regime, edited by J. Matthew Holden, a
publication of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists.
Much like the authors in the special volume in Radical America, who called
for a “rethinking” of the Mandela project, we are not seeking to rehash every
aspect of the story, but rather to revisit this pivotal moment in the Black
community’s relationship with the city of Boston, recounting what took place, and
evaluating where things stand 30 years later. Unlike much of that work, our
project employs a slightly different disciplinary lens—considering these events
from a historical perspective rather than an urban studies or social science one that
have characterized virtually all of the work on Mandela until now. As such, this
project uses oral histories as a key part of our analysis.

4

In terms of painting the foreground, other helpful works include: Lawrence Kennedy’s Planning the City Upon a
Hill: Boston since 1930 (1992); Alan Lupo’s Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston (1977); as
well as Jim Vrabel’s A People’s History of the New Boston; and Thomas H. O’Conner’s Building a New Boston;
Robert C. Hayden’ African Americans in Boston: More Than 350 Years. Boston: Boston Public Library Board of
Trustees, 1992
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The Context of the Mandela Idea
To fully examine the contemporary implications for Boston’s community of
color and what the idea of a new, separate majority-Black city would have meant
to Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, the Fenway, the South End, and parts of Dorchester and
Mattapan, it is important to note that Mandela was conceived by two relative
beginners to organizing whose idea created a lasting rift in the Black community,
with some Black elected officials supporting the referendum, while an active,
organized, and well-funded campaign worked to defeat it.
Although it may be easy to dismiss Andrew Jones and Curtis Davis as
outsiders, Jennings makes an important point, “I had major concerns with people
who would say, ‘Well, this is being pushed by outsiders.’ At the same time, the
same individuals did not see a contradiction between that and fighting this
apartheid in South Africa because the apartheid regime was saying the same thing.
Ronald Reagan, our president at the time, was saying the same thing.” (Jennings,
interview with authors, 2016)
One aspect that distinguishes our research from previous undertakings is that
we attempted to bring in “both sides” to this debate—not only the community, but
also elected officials and mayoral appointees. As such, we interviewed former
mayor Ray Flynn, his former chief of staff Neil Sullivan, and George Russell, who
served as the city’s treasurer at the time and utilized some of the materials
produced by the city—in an effort to give a more balanced interpretation of what
took place 30 years ago, hopefully allowing “cooler heads to prevail” after such a
divisive and turbulent moment in Boston’s history.
As mentioned previously, the idea of Mandela appeared only some 12
years after the court desegregation decision that prompted Boston’s busing crisis,
and despite Mayor Flynn’s best intentions and campaign promises, race relations
were at an all-time low. Sadly, they would only sink lower after Mandela when the
Charles Stuart murder case rocked Boston’s neighborhoods of color and was
handled poorly by the administration. At the same time, as historian Jeanne
Theoharis points out, “Flynn wanted to keep race out of the election, insisting that
racism was not an issue, but distributed different flyers in black and white areas.”
(Theoharis, 1996) The mayoral candidate famously styled himself a populist on the
campaign trail. Yet as Jennings reminds us, “The problem with a populist is that
they overlook race in U.S. society. And so remember, George Wallace was a
populist.” (Jennings, interview with authors, 2016)
In our research about Mandela, however, we discovered that Flynn and his
position during this time perhaps deserve a second glance. Certainly naïve in his
12

optimism that race relations could be improved so quickly after a bitter and racially
charged mayoral primary, Flynn himself seemed to have the best of intentions. He
integrated public housing in South Boston, an action that led to a direct
confrontation with his own constituency. In our interview with Flynn he
reminisced about having played basketball throughout the city of Boston, and
through that process having built a sense of camaraderie with some of his
teammates, many of who happened to be Black. He even boasted of having once
played on a semiprofessional basketball team, where his teammate was none other
than a young Mel King. (Raymond Flynn interview with Tomás González, 2016)
As Clavel writes, “Flynn was from an Irish family in South Boston. He was a
basketball star at Providence College, and later, when he returned to Boston, he
was elected to the state legislature and city council… He would reminisce about
coming back from college and a tryout with the Boston Celtics, and playing ball in
neighborhoods like the West End that were being decimated by urban renewal. He
got to know Mel King that way. In 1971 he found himself elected to the legislature
from South Boston and served there with King. Then, in 1978, he was on city
council through the mayoral race in 1983.” (Clavel, 2010: 55)
Rather than the aforementioned memories, what most will remember are
images of the first mayor elected from the neighborhood of South Boston riding
the fire engines to emergencies around the city—many of those fires occurring in
Roxbury—that were part of the larger legacy of arson that created so many of the
vacant buildings that eventually became empty lots.
According to Medoff and Sklar, authors of Streets of Hope, “In 1981,
Roxbury's Highland Park neighborhood was dubbed ‘The Arson Capital of the
Nation.’" Most of the fires, the Arson Commission noted, "were directly related to
increased speculation due to the Southwest Corridor Project," the massive
redevelopment project centered around the relocated mass transit Orange Line
(which used to run through Dudley Station) and extending from the South End
through Roxbury and Jamaica Plain. The Arson Commission stated: "Many of the
buildings that were burned were among the approximately 75 abandoned buildings
that local residents attempted to save for low-income housing and communitybased activities. When frightened residents, ignored then by Mayor [Kevin] White,
appealed" to the state for assistance, they "learned that Highland Park's fire
statistics were the highest in the Commonwealth.’" (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 31)
In a documentary made about the founding of the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative, “Holding Ground,” Byron Rushing recalled, “More and
more houses were being abandoned. And then a number of the owners of those
buildings decided that one of the ways that they could get their money back, and
maybe even make a quick profit, was to burn their houses down.” (Lipman and
Mahan, 1996) Che Madyun, a neighborhood resident who became a primary
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organizer in the Dudley Street effort, recalled: “You go to sleep at night and you
hear the sirens and you go, oh gosh here we go again, another building is gonna
burn down. You get up, you run to the window, you look. Sometimes you see it,
sometimes you smell it.” (Lipman and Mahan, 1996) The Rev. Paul Bothwell, a
resident and would-be organizer, also recollected, “I can remember kids being
dragged out already dead, kids being dragged out in flames, the father in flames,
running out of the house screaming and the neighborhood just stunned. And it
happened again and again and again.” (Lipman and Mahan, 1996) Again Madyun
offered, “Every night there was a fire. It was like this block and the next block and
the block after that. And each time they'd burn a house, they'd tear it down and you
had another vacant lot. So I saw the vacant lots increase. The amount of crap on
the vacant lots increased and it just kept getting worse and worse and worse.”
(Lipman and Mahan, 1996)
Gentrification and the Reemergence of Black Political Agency
In January 1986, Bruce Bolling Sr. was elected as the first Black president of
the Boston City Council in its 170-year history. Only three years before, King had
achieved the feat of being the first African-American candidate to make it into the
mayoral general election, putting up very respectable numbers in the quest for
power. In many ways, these two men embodied the two poles in the vast
ideological political spectrum of Boston’s Black community in the 1980s. King
was an organizer, while Bolling represented the existing political establishment;
one was from Roxbury and reflected a grassroots perspective, while the other was
from the South End. While these two men representing different constituencies
seemed dissimilar, in fact there was much that they shared: both were self-made
men who ran for the office of mayor, and both were leaders of the Black
community. There was, however, one key area in which they differed: King
supported Mandela; Bolling did not.
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “State Senator Royal Bolling, Sr., patriarch of
Boston's mainstream black political dynasty, supported the effort to put the
question on the ballot, but opposed the content of the proposal, saying, ‘We have
the swing vote to determine any election. So why give up the whole pie for just a
slice?’” Although Bolling's son Bruce Sr., then City Council President, initially
backed the referendum, he was slowly dragged into the opposition. (Kennedy and
Tilly, 1987, 24)
In the wake of the election of Bolling Sr. and King’s strong showing in the
1983 mayoral race, grassroots activists and community organizers in Roxbury were
fighting for economic redress. Black activists were tired of living in decaying and
crime-ridden neighborhoods while downtown Boston prospered. Black residents
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feared the rumored gentrification, which had already claimed the South End and
parts of Roxbury, both close to downtown. Beneath the commercial heart of
Roxbury, there were concerns that it was going to become the next South End,
which had in the earlier part of the twentieth century been the home to the majority
of Black, Puerto Rican, and West Indian residents. By the early 1980s, the South
End had become largely White and well off. The population shift was notable
given that members of this community provided King his base of support in 1968,
when he, along with a multitude of other demonstrators under the banner of the
Community Assembly for a United South End (CAUSE), occupied a parking lot at
130 Dartmouth Street to protest the displacement of residents by urban renewal.
This group of concerned citizens pitched tents and occupied the site for a number
of days. This protest led to the Tent City housing development, a mixed-income
high-rise that opened its doors on April 30 1988. (Vrabel, 2014, 123)
Tent City still stands defiantly amid multimillion-dollar buildings and the
luxuriousness of Copley Square. Although King held a strong front that would alter
the development to include affordable units, he could not save the entire the South
End. Amid the area’s increased investment and profitability, some Black families
managed to hold on to their properties, but sadly many others made the decision to
capitalize on rising home values and sold theirs. On the one hand, this led to
increased Black wealth through the ownership of market-priced homes, but the
results were nothing short of transformative. Latinos also struggled to hold on to
their portion of the South End, which resulted in the development of the Villa
Victoria apartment complex on Parcel 19—known more popularly as “La
Parcela”—the continued existence of which is a testament to their ongoing struggle
for community control. (Matos-Rodriguez, 2006)
In these early stages of gentrification, small, unified efforts could not
prevent the inevitable. Investment in Black communities became infectious, shortly
taking hold of the historic Roxbury Highlands—known locally as Fort Hill. Cruz
Construction would introduce the condominium real estate model to Eliot Square,
a picturesque section of the historic Highland Park section of Roxbury. It was
known that the city government planned to create additional municipal space to
Dudley Square, having already built a library branch and police station. Thirty
years later, the city purchased the long-vacant Ferdinand furniture building,
restoring it to its prior greatness, with mixed commercial and municipal office
space, including a café and bistro. In various ways, the renewal of the Ferdinand
building represents the culmination of Mandela. For many, this signaled the
potential resurgence of Dudley Square, the economic and transportation hub of
Roxbury, as well as serving as a symbol. Recent public investment included the
construction of a new police substation and the revitalization of the most glaring
eyesore right in the heart of Dudley Square, the Ferdinand Building, which has
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been renamed the Bruce Bolling Building. Boston’s newspapers routinely reported
on the racial shift and disinvestment in the city’s urban core, with the residential
transformation of these areas marking the slow but steady demographic
transformation as a new group of more affluent and younger Whites replaced
longtime Black residents. At the same time, longtime White residents fled the city
in droves to make the suburbs home. The South End, with its charming
brownstone-style row houses and carefully landscaped tree-lined streets, offered a
unique kind of urban living that was very appealing to the newly arrived young
urbanites and former suburban empty-nesters.
While most of the South End's housing was constructed during the Victorian
era, its history was not one of luxury. Whites began moving out of the area in the
late 1800s. In the early 1900s, the neighborhood became home to the city's Black
community, and in later years, Latinos and Chinese moved to the area. Just a
stone’s throw away from the railroad yards, which would later become Back Bay
Station and Copley Square, the South End side of the tracks was constantly filled
with ash and soot from the steam-powered trains, which brought passengers and
cargo to and from New York and all points in between. Many of the men who
worked in the railroad yards, Pullman porters, lived in the South End community,
which was not only conveniently located to the yards, but also more affordable.
There were always rooms for rent in the South End’s brownstones. Often owned
by Blacks, these homes were sometimes rented out as rooming houses. As Andrew
Buni and Alan Rogers point out, “Job discrimination, for example, systematically
deprived black artisans of their trades. This meant that many men were forced to
seek low-paying, unskilled jobs in the rail yards and station of the South End.
(Buni, Rogers, and Whelan, 1984)
While some of the longtime homeowners may have stood to gain financially
from community-wide reinvestment and the development in the South End, many
residents of Roxbury were more skeptical about the prospects of development.
Buni writes, “In the South End, for example, long-time residents were amazed
when brownstone homes that their immigrant owners could not sell for $5,000 in
1950 were being sold for more than 10 times that amount a decade later.” (Buni et
al., 1984)
The mood in Roxbury in the 1980s was one of defiance, especially after
having witnessed the decimation of the Black community in the South End, where
Black residents were displaced by Whites, and parts of Lower Roxbury, which fell
victim to the rapidly expanding campus of Northeastern University. Instead of
relying on the promises of White elected officials, they turned their energy to the
political process and supported Black candidates for local elections. In fits and
starts, the proud Black political tradition in Boston was revived when John D.
O’Bryant in 1978 became the first African American elected to the Boston School
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Committee. Bruce Bolling Sr. and his family had brought a grace and dignity to
Black politics that gave many a sense of pride. Byron Rushing replaced King as
the state representative from the South End.
A City Called Mandela: The Actors
In the early 1980s, largely through the acumen of two men, Andrew Jones
and Curtis Davis, residents of Roxbury decided they needed to do something big, if
Boston’s communities of color were to ever prosper. Jones and Davis decided that
Boston’s communities of color had to secede from the city of Boston in order to
become self-reliant and maintain community control. Jones, a 34-year-old classical
violinist, independent TV producer, and sometime actor, and Davis, a Harvardtrained architect, started an organization called GRIP (the Greater Roxbury
Incorporation Project) and so began the tumultuous fight for Black self-sufficiency.
Their proposal would have taken Roxbury and other neighborhoods and renamed
the area Mandela. The proposed city would have carved out 25 percent of Boston’s
geographical terrain. Although the measure went down to a resounding defeat, the
referendum amounted to a vote on the quality of City Hall's governance of
Boston's Black community.
So who were Jones and Davis, the two major drivers behind this idea that
sparked political imaginations aflame in the 1980s and then seemingly
disappeared? Jones was a multitalented individual who first came to New England
as a child from Richmond to attend Phillips Exeter Academy, the college prep
school in New Hampshire. After graduating from Exeter in 1970, the accomplished
violinist studied at the New England Conservatory of Music and later earned a
master's degree in journalism from Boston University in 1982. After working as an
ABC television network producer, foreign correspondent, and field producer of
sorts, he became a successful documentary filmmaker. In 1995, he left Boston and
settled in Johannesburg, South Africa. After a faltering marriage and troubled
family life, Jones became better known in more recent times as a father’s rights
advocate after being labeled a “deadbeat dad.” “In 2003, after voluntarily
returning from South Africa to argue his case, Jones had his passport seized and
was led out of the Edward Brooke Courthouse in handcuffs and taken to the South
Bay House of Correction. The 52-year-old filmmaker spent 60 days in lockup
while his wife and family sold assets and emptied bank accounts to come up with
over $30,000 to begin satisfying the $100,000 child support judgment against
him.” (Bay State Banner, 2005)
Davis was trained as an architect and community development activist. He
worked for a neighborhood nonprofit at the time. Davis and Jones were once
neighbors, and Davis’s wife attended the New England Conservatory of Music. He
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worked for the Greater Roxbury Development Corporation, which was one of three
community development corporations in Boston that dated back to the War on
Poverty, called Title VII CDCs.
So how did its two prime movers go about the undertaking of creating
Mandela? Davis explained: “We sponsored monthly breakfast meetings at the
Harvard Faculty Club. As a Harvard alumn[us], I had access to the faculty club.
And this is with people in the community. Why do we do that? Well, we knew
that if we said, hey, come, and let’s meet at the local, you know, breakfast joint on
the street, people wouldn't take it take it as serious. But when we kind of hosted
these little breakfast meetings at the Harvard Faculty Club, people came. And they
came with a fairly serious intent; they took us more seriously. So Gloria Fox, Mel
King, and many, many others, we met with, for a year one-on-one at breakfast
meetings. So well before the campaign, we seeded the idea throughout the political
leadership and community leadership, partly to give people the ability to either
claim or disclaim us based on their own personal agendas.” (Davis, 2015)
As a Boston Globe article pointed out, much of Mandela would have
contained institutions such as Harvard Medical School, the Boston Museum of
Fine Arts, Northeastern University, and the John F. Kennedy Library. Add to that
the number of Whites who still lived in the area that would become Mandela. The
article reported, “Coincidentally or not, the targeted area encompasses the
predominantly minority neighborhoods. This has led many to assume it is strictly a
minority affair, but white residents also lived throughout the targeted areas of
Dorchester, Mattapan, Jamaica Plain, the South End, the Fenway and Roxbury.
The presence of white residents who elected to live in an integrated neighborhood
is a sign that the racial climate in Boston has improved. That makes secession a
Boston issue.” (Patterson, Boston Globe, October 12, 1986, p. 72).
The Town of Rocksbury
It is said that the name "Rocksbury" or "Rocksborough" was taken from the
puddingstone, a type of rock common to the area. Historically, the Roxbury area
extended to Dorchester on the south, Brookline to the north, Dedham to the west,
and Boston on the east. In 1630, it became the sixth town to become incorporated
in Massachusetts. The earliest settlement of the area, known as Eliot Square,
centered around the First Church in Roxbury. The entire village of Roxbury was
housed on “Roxbury Street” with scattered farms.
In 1652, Roxbury was a quiet suburban village with an estimated population
of about 700 people. The number of residents increased very slowly to 1,467 in
the colonial census of 1765. The Town of West Roxbury, which also included a
part of Jamaica Plain, separated from Roxbury in 1861 and was annexed to Boston
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in 1874. By 1868, the growth of Roxbury was noticeable in terms of structures and
population, and residents voted in favor of annexation to take advantage of
Boston’s city services. In many ways, Roxbury was the first suburb of Boston,
controlled largely by wealthy families who worked in Boston proper but wanted a
country home.
For much of its early history, Roxbury was politically and geographically
isolated from Boston. The first settlers were English emigrants, the Puritans who
sailed with John Winthrop, first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. As
Bailey, Turner, and Hayden write in Lower Roxbury A Community of Treasures in
the City of Boston, “Old Roxbury extended for eight miles from east to west and
two miles north to south and included present-day West Roxbury, Jamaica Plain,
and part of Brookline. The ‘Neck,’ the long narrow strip of land connecting
Roxbury to Boston, was more than a mile long and had a dam on either side to
prevent overflow from the tides. In the early years of settlement the area was
fortified to protect whites from attacks by Native Americans.” (Bailey et al., 2) In
1846, Roxbury became a city, and remained so until Boston annexed it in 1868.
The fact that Roxbury was once a separate city and encompassed many of the areas
sought in the 1986 Mandela proposal makes the idea of secession less far-fetched
than one might have first considered.
A salvo titled “A Roxbury Government Open Letter” appeared in the Bay
State Banner in 1965, written by a young Byron Rushing. A newcomer to
Cambridge and Boston, the New York native entered Harvard University in the fall
of 1960. He wrote, “If the Negro community of Boston can be characterized by
one word, that word is "powerless." We have no power. And we will never be free
unless we are strong, unless we can acquire power. The weak can't help but be
slaves. The primary political issue for the Negro in Roxbury (as it is for Negroes in
most northern cities) is the acquisition of power. The question is "How?" (Rushing,
1965)
He continued, “Certain community leaders have recently been talking about
setting up a Roxbury government. This is an excellent idea—only if they really
mean it. I'm tired of symbolic actions and educational campaigns. I am ready to
fight to win—for real power.” (Rushing, 1965) His letter continues:
Almost a hundred years ago, the City of Roxbury decided
to become a part of Boston. They did this for several
reasons: to get the benefits of the water and sewage
systems, to have the trolley tracks extended to Roxbury, to
have gas lines put in for street lights and cooking stoves, to
get their streets paved, etc. Now a hundred years later most
of the functions that the city of Boston gave to Roxbury no
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longer come from Boston. Our transportation is controlled
by the MBTA a state chartered agency to which Boston,
along with suburban cities and towns, is a member. Our
water is supplied by a similar organization, the MDC.
What do we receive from the City of Boston? The Police,
the schools, the Welfare Department, the Sanitation
Department, and DPW, the Park Dept. Who in Roxbury is
satisfied with the services supplied by any of these
branches of our city government? (Rushing, 1965)
What Rushing could not have realized was that 20 years later, his article
would be read by two people who also yearned for true freedom and the purest
exercise of democracy—Jones and Davis, the founders of GRIP. Davis invited
Rushing to come speak to a discussion group of “young professional/intellectual
black men.”(Bingham, 2014) Of Jones, Rushing recalled: “So, he had done some
research, and one of the things he came across was an article that I had written in
the Bay State Banner in the 1960s about whether Roxbury should be independent
or not.” (Bingham, 2014)
According to Rushing:
So, we had talked about that in the 60s and it never picked up, but it
never got any legs. There were a group of people thinking about it
and then we couldn’t get much support for it, and so this little
article had just been there, but Andrew had found it. And he
suggested at this meeting that we should do that except those
boundaries weren’t going to work and he wanted to know what I
thought about coming up with boundaries, what could we look at
and so that’s how I got into this. And then he kept working on it,
we kept looking at what political thing could we do, and he began
organizing around this, he organized a group because what he was
still talking about for a name was Roxbury, so he called it GRIP,
Greater Roxbury Incorporation Project, because that was what we’d
be doing, we’d be incorporating a political area into a city.
(Rushing, 2014)
A City Called Nairobi: East Palo Alto
To those who asked how Mandela could survive on its own, proponents of
Mandela pointed to the incorporation of East Palo Alto, a small community north
of Palo Alto, California in the San Mateo Valley. The original organizers behind
the incorporation of East Palo Alto initially wanted to rename the area Nairobi. An
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interesting side note was that a young Ronald Bailey, who would later come to
Boston to chair the Department of African-American Studies at Northeastern
University in 1989, worked on the project. He authored, along with Diane Turner
and Robert Hayden, an indispensable, independently published history, Lower
Roxbury: A Community of Treasures in the City of Boston, with a preface by
Danette Jones of the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation.
Bailey wrote, “As a graduate student at Stanford, I worked on the history
and incorporation efforts of East Palo Alto, California, often called Nairobi.”
(Bailey et al., 1989) While East Palo Alto was successful in creating its own city,
there were several differences between that situation and the Mandela struggle. By
the 1980s, when East Palo Alto achieved this feat, the area was largely African
American after many families moved into the area in the 1950s.
While advocates contended that a precedent had already been set, there are
several distinguishing factors that make this comparison flawed. East Palo Alto
was already set apart by a river and, unlike Roxbury, had never been incorporated.
Unlike Roxbury, East Palo Alto has always been a separate entity since its
founding as an unincorporated community. It is also in San Mateo County, while
Palo Alto is in Santa Clara County. The two cities are separated by San
Francisquito Creek.
As Nancy Haggard-Gilson has argued, “The experience of East Palo Alto,
however, should prove that those skeptical of Mandela's viability were correct.
East Palo Alto is bankrupt. Its inability to provide services to its citizens forced the
surrounding county, with aid from the state of California, to offer short-term
contracts for police and emergency crews. More critically, the city continues to be
economically isolated from the surrounding area. It has not been able to translate a
resolve to defend minority rights into economic development in the absence of an
indigenous, independent business base. As conditions have worsened, East Palo
Alto has become politically divided.” (Haggard-Gilson, 1995)
The founders of Mandela could have looked closer to home for two
examples of annexation towns frustrated with the poor city services they were
receiving. Charlestown and Hyde Park both experienced political moments in
which secession was proposed as a viable option, as documented in Jim Vrabel’s A
People’s History of Boston.
According to Vrabel, “On September 24, 1962… more than 2,000 [Hyde
Park residents] filled the auditorium of Hyde Park High to show how upset they
were that their location would provide no protection from the threat of the
proposed highway. They were treated that evening to a particularly inept
presentation by a state DPW official, whose best argument for the Southwest
Expressway seemed to be that it would displace fewer people than the Inner Belt.
Five residents were not persuaded, and, soon after, many signed a petition to
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secede from Boston. They sent it to the Massachusetts legislature fifty years to the
day after Hyde Park had allowed itself to be annexed.” (Vrabel, 2014, 23)
Vrabel continues: “On April 27, 1965 more than 400 [Charlestown
residents] descended on City Hall for a four-and-a-half-hour hearing described in a
front-page Boston Globe headline as ‘the wildest session ever staged in City Hall’s
council chambers.’ Not long after that, 350 residents signed a petition asking the
state legislature ‘to authorize the citizens of Charlestown to form a government
completely independent of the city. Charlestown didn’t secede from Boston, and
urban renewal did proceed. But it did so in a way that was more carefully thought
out.’” (Vrabel, 2014, 23)
Urban Renewal or Urban “Removal”
Boston’s Black population has never been particularly large.
Although Boston's total population was close to 800,000 in 1930 and the
city ranked as one of the nation’s most heavily populated municipalities
during this decade, Boston had fewer Black residents percentage-wise than
any other urban center whose population was greater than 500,000.
Although Boston did have a relatively sizable Black population at the turn of
the century, the city did not witness the rather dramatic surge in Black population,
brought about by the Great Migration in other cities, during the years 1910 to
1925. Rather, Boston's Black population increased more gradually, by 20.5
percent, during the decade of 1910 to 1920, and from1920 to 1930, 25.8 percent.
That percentage growth did not dramatically alter the absolute percentage of Black
presence in the city on the eve of American involvement in World War II. In
1910, Blacks comprised 2 percent of Boston’s population. In 1920, they were 2.2
percent of the population; in 1930, 2.6 percent; and 1940, 3 percent. Thus, race
relations in Boston during the first half of the twentieth century would be shaped to
some degree by the relatively small size of the Black population. It was small but
quite complex in its ethnic character and place of origin.
More than one-third of its Black residents were born in Massachusetts,
allowing Boston to enjoy the distinction among large non-southern cities of having
the highest percentage of native-born Black residents. Moreover, one-sixth of
Boston’s Black population was foreign-born, emigrating principally from Jamaica,
Barbados, other small British colonial possessions, and the Cape Verdean islands
off the West Coast of Africa.5
5
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As a result of Boston’s increasing population, the Black community slowly
began to move from Beacon Hill into the expanded South End area. With the
development of an affordable public transportation system, there was a migration
into Roxbury and Dorchester, which had previously functioned as suburban
bedroom communities.
The 1950s and 1960s brought many economic changes and spurred the rapid
growth and development in terms of Black migration to Boston, although during
World War I Boston’s share of the Great Migration was smaller than it was in
other northern cities. The historically small Black population of Boston grew in the
post–World War II era, when more African Americans migrated to the city in
search of jobs and better political and economic opportunities. Unlike immigrants
from abroad, notably Irish Americans, racial bias prevented Blacks from securing
the government jobs that employed a large percentage of the city's workforce. Of
these “newcomers," many came directly from the South, while many others came
to Boston after a relatively short stay in one of the other ports of entry to the north
(Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, etc.).
As more African Americans and West Indians arrived in the city in search of
jobs and improved political and economic opportunities, they were met with an
influx of immigrants from Europe that created unique pressures and conflicts for
the relatively small Black population. Racist hiring practices, however, often
prevented Blacks from reaping the benefits of the financial growth of the city. In
the 1970s, Black workers earned only about two-thirds of what their White
counterparts did. A legacy of redlining and discriminatory lending practices
prevented Blacks from moving into such outlying areas as Hyde Park and West
Roxbury, where many working-class people owned their own homes. Blacks were
also kept out of poorer White working-class neighborhoods, such as South Boston,
Charlestown, and East Boston. 6 As African Americans were pushed out of the
historically Black neighborhoods of the South End and Lower Roxbury, ghettos
began to emerge in the areas surrounding Roxbury, Mattapan, and Dorchester. The
schools and housing in these neighborhoods were inadequate and lacked basic
resources.
At the same time, Boston underwent many structural changes in the name of
urban renewal as entire neighborhoods were demolished to make way for the city's
expansion. As Lew Finfer, a longtime Boston-community organizer, states, “In
Verdean American Immigrants, 1860–1965, Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Centennial Series. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1993.
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segregated ethnic neighborhoods.
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1958 the West End Urban Renewal program began, in which the West End
neighborhood was torn down to build Charles River Park luxury apartments. West
Enders were promised the right of return, but few could afford the market-rate
apartments they were offered. Jerome Rappaport, a former aide to Mayor Hynes,
was picked as developer of the Charles River Park Apartments. Rappaport served
as a major power broker for his interests and real estate interests in Boston over the
next 50 years.” (Finfer, 2016)
According to Finfer, there were several key events that defined the struggle
and in many ways paved the way for the Mandela initiative to come, including a
citywide and metropolitan campaign to stop the proposed 10-lane Inner Belt/ I-95
extension that was to go from Route 128/Dedham, through Boston and Cambridge,
and connect to I-93 in Somerville (also included was extending I-95 through
Lynn). He stated, “A famous sign was painted on the railroad crossing in Jamaica
Plain: ‘Stop I-95—People Before Highways’ to symbolize the organizing
campaign.” As Finfer recalls, “In 1970, Governor Sargent announced a
moratorium on construction of this highway. Funds were later shifted to instead
build the new MBTA Orange Line and the Southwest Corridor parks. It is for that
reason that a memorial with the history of this organizing, recognizing the many
neighborhood leaders who worked on this, is located right outside of the Roxbury
Crossing MBTA station.” (Finfer, 2016)
Nationally, 1968 proved to be a most tumultuous year, and Boston would
see its fair share of violence. In a response to the riots that followed Martin Luther
King’s death, Mayor White and the Boston business community initiated three
programs that, while perhaps well intended, exacerbated the major problems
confronting rioting communities like Grove Hall. (Finfer, 2016)
The riots of 1968, which seemed to be sparked by the King assassination,
were in fact a reaction to decades of injustice and inequality. Despite Boston’s
exclusion from those cities most well known for urban rebellions, only a year
earlier, the city was the site of the so-called welfare riot of 1967, during which
local businesses were destroyed and scores of people were injured. What began as
a peaceful demonstration turned tragic when Boston police officers broke up the
assembled crowd. Their action led to an angry mob gathering in support of the
protesters.
On April 6, 1968, nearly 5,000 people attended a rally organized by the
Black United Front, which was created out of the riots and headed by King,
Turner, and Byron Rushing, at White Stadium in Franklin Park, at which a list of
demands was presented that included: “(the transfer of the ownership of ... [Whiteowned] businesses to the black community, ... every school in the black
community shall have all-black staff, ... [and] control of all public, private, and
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municipal agencies that affect the lives of the people in this community." (Vrabel,
2004, 335)
In the wake of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 outlawed discrimination in the housing market and suddenly made it
possible for many Black families to purchase homes in any neighborhood. Finfer
stated, “This led to the formation of the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group
(BBURG), which existed between 1968 and 1972. In this well-intended but
ultimately failed initiative, banks promised to make home ownership loans to
African American families. However, in this program Black families could buy
homes only in existing Black neighborhoods and the then predominantly White
and predominantly Jewish sections of Mattapan and western Dorchester. This
‘reverse redlining’ led to blockbusting by realtors and racial conflict as
neighborhoods turned from 90% White to 90% Black in only four years.” Authors
Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon, in their 1992 book The Death of an
American Jewish Community: A Tragedy of Good Intentions, wrote: "The Boston
Banks Urban Renewal Group program was to housing what court-ordered
desegregation was to education: while creating the impression of fairness, in reality
it created more problems than it solved." (Levine and Harmon, 1992)
The White working-class victims of the city's transformation responded by
electing leaders who would defend the neighborhoods at all costs, including the
right to retain their own neighborhood schools. In the face of municipal power and
the federal court, anti-busing extremists resorted to violence to protest against
school desegregation that led to violence in the streets and nearly daily fights in the
hallways and classrooms of Boston's public schools. Competition around jobs was
a main source of tension in the city, where the contestation over de facto residential
segregation and urban renewal had more far-reaching consequences. Although
increased opportunity led to some occupational and economic gains for Blacks,
compared to Whites’, those figures remained low. Unlike other cities that had
sustained periods of Black migration, Boston's Black community continued to have
difficulty in achieving political parity with the long-established White ethnic
population because of its relatively small numbers. In spite of the victory of
Thomas Atkins for city councilor in 1967, African Americans were unable to win
many seats in local and state government. Without a political voice, municipal
jobs, which were often reserved for the relatives of White elected officials,
continued to remain elusive to African Americans. This situation would improve
somewhat in the 1970s and 1980s, when King ran his mayoral races of 1979 and
1983.
A Rainbow Coalition
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The major issue coming out of the 1960s for Black Bostonians was
“community control” and self-determination. By the 1980s, that translated
into land control and a say in the development of their own neighborhoods.
One could argue that land control was perhaps just as pertinent for the
1980s as school desegregation was for the 1970s. The quest for control
would manifest itself in many ways in Boston’s political scene. Yet the
failure to establish Mandela showed a reluctance of a cross section of
Boston residents to accept this unorthodox approach to Black
empowerment. Corporate leaders clearly did not see Mandela to be in their
best interests, and a number of White residents and some Black leaders
opposed the proposition.” (Boston Globe Magazine, April 12, 1987, 19)
By 1985, the number of Blacks and Latinos elected mayor in American cities had
grown dramatically, from zero in 1960 to twenty-seven Black and three Latinos.
They were mayors of cities with populations of over 50,000. (Browning, Marshall,
and Tabb, 2003, 5) The lack of Black elected officials in Boston was a major
problem with no easy answers. In 1953, 1961, 1963, and 1965, King, a social
worker and community activist, ran unsuccessfully for a seat on the Boston School
Committee. As with many other candidates, there was just not a strong enough
base to mount a successful campaign.
For Blacks to win elections in Boston, as in most major American cities, it
was essential to form political coalitions that often included large groups of
minorities and progressive Whites. By the 1960s, Blacks and Latinos had gained
access to city jobs, expanding their influence and improving city programs. The
civil rights movement and local mobilization efforts became critical tests not only
of minorities’ ability to sustain a high level of political activity but also of the
promise of the democratic participation of all citizens.
A multiracial coalition and trailblazing experiment in minority politics was
realized in 1983 when King, who had been elected to the state’s legislature in
1973, mounted a serious bid in the Boston mayoral campaign against City
Councilor Raymond Flynn and five other White candidates. King was first elected
as a state representative from the South End and served in the Legislature until
1982. King mobilized a "rainbow coalition" through a voter registration campaign
aimed at Blacks and Latinos. With endorsements from national Black leadership at
the time, such as Chicago mayor Harold Washington and Democratic presidential
contender Jesse Jackson, King's registration drive swelled the rolls by 25 percent in
the months before the election. (Erie, 1988, 187) Although he ultimately lost to
Flynn in the final election, King amassed a coalition that was an exercise in the
effectiveness of minorities banding together—and attracting White allies—to
further their political agenda.
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This feat becomes more impressive as one imagines the historic record of
racial divisiveness in Boston, including the violent episodes during the school
desegregation crisis that fractured the city. Mandela was in some ways an
outgrowth of the 1983 campaign. Jennings makes an interesting point in terms of
the presumed connection between King’s political campaign and the Mandela
campaign. “The way I would explain that piece of politics, it was part of a
changing mindset in Boston. It was part of a mindset that said, ‘You know, we
have a right—people who have not been at the table downtown—we have a right
to think about what this city should be like and how it should be organized’ and
so…in one sense, Mel King and the Rainbow Coalition and that whole mindset is a
frontal assault on continuing racial and economic injustice in the city of Boston.
It’s a frontal political assault. Mandela is sort of a different front. It’s not a frontal
assault in a sense. But it says, ‘Look, I—we think we can do better than you.’
And so we’re going to push an idea that also reflects, just like Mel King and the
Rainbow Coalition reflect, an idea that, you know, a city can be a just city. A city
is not beautiful if it’s not a just city.” (Jennings, interview with authors, 2016)
King was a dedicated enemy of racial segregation in schools and housing.
As a result of redistricting in 1971, Blacks improved their chances of gaining more
than just one seat for Roxbury in the Legislature. Redistricting brought four Blacks
into the State House the next election year: Doris Bunte (the first African
American woman to serve in the Legislature), Bill Owens, Royal Bolling Jr., and
King. This cluster formed the Massachusetts Black Caucus, a new institution that
played a key role in municipal and state politics. (Browning et al., 2003, 115)
As a long outspoken and visible leader of the Black community, King set the
framework for a Rainbow Coalition long before he ran for mayor. By being
outspoken on a number of issues concerning Blacks and other groups, he was able
to draw widespread support from the women's, anti-racist, and gay rights
movements of Boston. According to William Nelson, author of Black Atlantic
Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston and Liverpool, “Mel King
was able to mobilize an unprecedented number of progressives to volunteer and
work for his campaign. These individuals were attracted to King’s persona, his
integrity, his track record as a committed, community activist, and his vision of a
new Boston sensitive to the needs of the poor. The message he delivered was so
captivating that much of his platform was adopted by his opponents.” (Nelson,
2000, 123)
It actually seemed like King was at the forefront of a multi-issue, multigroup movement, as his Rainbow Coalition was a true multiracial alliance of
Latinos, Asians, Blacks, feminists, and gay rights activists. He was the first African
American to qualify for a final mayoral election in Boston. (Browning et al., 2003,
118)
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Despite its success in propelling King to second in the primary and into the
final, the Rainbow Coalition did not succeed in electing him as mayor. A reason
for this, as one observer notes, is that after the primary election, a change in
strategy to make more of an attempt to reach out to White voters may have
alienated many Black and other minority voters. This decision corresponded to an
effort to blur the lines of the rainbow—to make it seem less like a Black
empowerment and anti-racist movement and more like a broad humanistic appeal
that included White neighborhoods. In the final tally, 128,578 voters supported
Flynn; King received 69,015 votes. At 69.5 percent, turnout for the election was
the highest for a mayoral election in Boston since 1949. (Vrabel, 2014, 358)
Despite his loss, King took 35 percent of votes in the final election. His campaign
formed a veritable multiracial grassroots movement that would have implications
for Boston's future.
More significantly, King’s campaign forced the mayor-elect to take
positions on a number of issues of concern to Blacks and other minorities. Flynn
had won less than 5 percent of the vote in Roxbury and had very little support
among people in communities of color. As mayor, Flynn spoke about being deeply
committed to improving the city and becoming more effective in the development
of Boston’s neighborhoods. He had been one of the most vocal politicians in
opposition to school desegregation during Boston’s busing crisis, but not one who
incited violence. This has been well documented. Again, Jeanne Theoharis is
helpful here: “While the newspapers tended to portray their politics as
interchangeable, Flynn and King stood for two different sides of Boston. Flynn, a
white state representative and city councilman, had originally been opposed to
court-order busing and school desegregation but now embraced a vision of a united
city. King, a black community activist and former state representative, had been
active in the school desegregation campaign as well as other community initiatives
against the BRA and other development.” (Theoharis, 1996)
Perhaps it came as a surprise to some observers when King, after building
such a multiracial coalition, endorsed “Mandela,” which most people considered to
be a nationalist-separatist project. Was there a contradiction between the Rainbow
Coalition and Mandela? As Kennedy and Tilly write, “King was singled out for
particularly vicious criticism in articles that predicted support for Mandela would
end his political career. Even after the defeat of the referendum, Flynn and the
Globe blasted politicians who supported Mandela as well as, in the Globe's words,
‘politicians who counseled “maybe” on this important issue.’ (Kennedy and Tilly,
1987, 24) At the time of Mandela, Jennings was quoted as saying, “The white
powerholders of Boston are doing their best to control black leadership in the
city—to suppress insurgent black leaders, and to facilitate the emergence of
‘cooperative’ black leaders.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 24)
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In his campaign for mayor, Flynn made a populist appeal to many lowerincome White voters in which he promised a move away from downtown
development and toward community and neighborhood development. His coalition
consisted principally of White working-class people hurt by the policies of the
administration of former mayor Kevin White. Flynn was also able to add an
economist’s approach that emphasized growth and an economic share of the pie for
lower-class Whites as well as minorities.
As Peter Dreier notes, “The Flynn administration had been given a mandate
by the voter to ‘share the prosperity’ of Boston’s downtown economic boom.” He
goes on to say, “What the Flynn administration inherited was a city of contrasts.
By 1984, Boston’s economy was well along to shifting from a manufacturing base
to a service-based economy, spurring the development of downtown buildings,
university and medical research centers, and high-technology industries. This
economic boom created new problems and compounded some old ones.
Neighborhoods near downtown or close to universities and hospitals were
becoming gentrified, pricing working-class and moderate-income residents out of
the market… lower-income neighborhoods faced redlining and disinvestment; the
minority unemployment rate was twice that of the city at large; and many of the
jobs held by Boston residents were in the low-paying portion of the new serviceoriented economy.” (Krumholz and Clavel, 1994)
Dreier notes, “The inconsistency between Boston’s thriving economy and
the socioeconomic conditions of the city’s working class provided the Flynn
administration with a mandate for a redistributionist policy agenda. The pattern of
development described previously had created economic prosperity for some and
had made life difficult for many others, especially in the areas of jobs and
housing.” (Krumholz and Clavel, 1994) To his credit, Flynn appeared to want to
truly live up to his populist rhetoric of the campaign. Flynn became known as
“mayor of the neighborhoods.” King’s loss, however, brought to the fore the
issues of community control and self-determination in Roxbury. At the end of the
day, the idea of Mandela became a threat. As Gloria Fox, a state representative
from Roxbury since 1986, recalls, “We set up hearings, not only in the community,
but here at the State House as well. It got very, very, very, very controversial. A
number of times it got very, very heated, with people wanting to come to blows—
you know, around us wanting our independence, wanting to secede from the city of
Boston. Thinking and talking about having our own police force, having our own
fire department, having our own money, having our own tax rates, having our own
businesses, and reaping the profits of those businesses only for Roxbury became
very, very dangerous to the other community. And when I say the other
community I do mean the White community and those people—those Black people
that supported that—that group of people. It became very, very dangerous, and so
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people got even more serious in trying to block how we were getting attention.”
(Interview with Jeremy Bingham, 2014)
King, interviewed about Mandela in 1990, remarked, “I think again that this
is a struggle for the land and a struggle for the money. And I think that the issue
around Mandela is principally a struggle for the money. And if people believe in
themselves and in the fact that they have the capacity to fashion out a community
that will provide for its residents and its people in ways that are vastly superior to
what is being offered to them now, then they should go for it.” (Turner, 1990)
“Yes We Stay, No We Go”
According to a Boston Globe article, “The failure to establish Mandela
showed a reluctance of a cross section of Boston residents to accept this
unorthodox approach to Black empowerment. Corporate leaders clearly did not
see Mandela to be in their best interests, and a number of White residents and some
Black leaders opposed the proposition.” (Boston Globe Magazine, April 12, 1987,
19) State representatives Byron Rushing and Royal Bolling Jr. were Mandela
supporters, as was Chuck Turner, a community activist, later a Boston city
councilor representing Roxbury, and cofounder of the Greater Roxbury
Neighborhood Authority. State Senator Royal Bolling Sr. came out in opposition
to Mandela. Joyce Ferriabough-Bolling, longtime political consultant and wife of
the late Bruce Bolling Sr., ran the opposition campaign. According to a Bay State
Banner article, after hearing Jones grumbling about Flynn's "plantation politics,"
Ferriabough-Bolling confronted him. "How do you want your ass kicking?" she
asked. "Over easy or well done?" (Bay State Banner, November 11, 2010)
That same article notes that Jones acknowledged that the Greater Roxbury
Incorporation Project should have been hatched at kitchen tables in Roxbury rather
than over linen tablecloths at the Harvard Faculty Club. Ferriabough-Bolling
respected Jones’s passion but questioned his judgment. Davis asserts that Mandela
was never about “secession,” but rather “incorporation.” Mandela “wasn’t a
secessionist movement, it was an incorporation. And we never—that was what we
could never kind of overcome, because we also at the same time leaned on the
Black Nationalist rhetoric. It was very easy for the media to take that rhetoric and
[call us] secessionists. So we just lived with that. But that was not what was the
intellectual or the tactical framework that we were working from. So tactically,
incorporation, we felt, was a move that had a very, very powerful impact because it
affected so much of the legal and economic structure of the city that we knew if we
made a credible move to that, we were going to get reaction, all kinds of reactions.
And we did. Some good, some bad, some predictable, some unpredictable.”
(Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015)
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Kennedy and Tilly agree on the strategy of Black Nationalist rhetoric,
writing: “GRIP appealed for votes based on several rationales: reversing the
decades of racist neglect experienced by Roxbury, controlling the impending flood
of investment, and simply gaining accountable government. Although the
reincorporation strategy clearly draws on black nationalism, GRIP often adopted
moderate and even ‘all-American’ rhetoric: GRIP's main position paper begins,
‘Independence. It is as much a part of the Massachusetts spirit as it is the American
one, if not more so.’ GRIP's literature emphasized, "Our community is integrated
and our city will be, too.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 23)
Some even went as far as to accuse Jones and Davis of making money off
the Mandela initiative, but Davis said that was not the case:
We weren’t accepting money from outside sources. We [could
have] had lots of money from wealthy people all around the
country. LA, Chicago, Houston. We could’ve gotten millions of
dollars to support the campaign, but we chose not to do that because
it would undermine the overall thesis. That is, the community
ought to be able to support itself. And so it wasn’t about winning,
per se. The win was a much more strategic vision of communityfelt empowerment. So the fatalistic argument, which said, “hey, is
this making a move to shake up the city?” was a very thin analysis.
It was a lot deeper than that. We weren’t interested in making
Flynn’s days difficult. That was not what that was about.
(Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015)
While Davis brought a theoretical approach, Jones should be credited with
the imaginative way of getting Mandela on the ballot. Of Jones and Davis,
Rushing said:
And they decide that one of the organizing tools to use is to
get a vote on this issue, but the only way they can do that is to
have a vote in state representative districts.
So, in
Massachusetts we allow nonbinding questions to be put on the
ballot in state representative districts because the questions are
to get the state representative to know what its constituents are
thinking. So, you can put a question, you have to do this by
petition, it’s not many names, and then on the ballot in the
next state election you could have a question like, we believe
our state representatives should vote for incorporation. So,
you could put that question on and that’s the tool that they
use. And so we have in a state election during that time in
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about six or seven state representative districts, there are
several that they put this question.
And that state
representative district might be, the geography of that state
representative district might wholly be included in the area
they planned to have become the city or it might just be
partially included. Because they did their whole organizing
around geography around precincts and so they looked for all
the precincts that had majority Black people in them and put
them together. And, of course, get[ting] back to what I said
about how segregated the city was, it was no big problem. So
you put them all together and you have, except for one
exception, it was a continuous area… That was this public
housing project that had been built on a peninsula that stuck
out into the ocean called Columbia Point, and that precinct of
course was predominantly Black, and now it’s separated from
the mass of Black people in this city. (Interview with Jeremy
Bingham, 2014)
Jones was also particularly effective in keeping Mandela in the media thanks
to his experience as a journalist. Once a writer for the Boston Globe and a public
relations maven, Jones knew how to fan the flames. From the State House steps,
joined by King, he held one of many news conferences on October 13, 1986,
leading up to the vote in November, in which he read aloud a letter written to
Michael Dukakis, urging the Massachusetts governor to appoint a special panel "to
carefully and objectively examine the structural feasibility of municipal
incorporation for our community." The letter stated, "The legacy of discrimination
has left deep scars among the youth of our community. Their rage is causing them
to self-destruct before our eyes and something must be done . . . This process must
be halted and the seeds of a new legacy must be sown." (Boston Globe, October
14, 1986) The governor was unavailable for comment, but issued a statement that
read in part: "While there are obviously legitimate concerns within the community,
the only way to address those concerns and to solve the problems that come about
is to continue to work together. Secession does not accomplish that." (Boston
Globe, Oct. 14, 1986)
In what would become a predictable volley between Flynn and Mandela
advocates, Flynn released a similar statement: “We welcome the comments by the
governor's office which stress that secession is not an answer but is in fact a step
backwards. The answer that is clearly in the best interest of the state and the city is
one in which every community works with all the people." (Vennochi, 1986)
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“One Boston”
The opposition to Mandela was strong and varied, with activists, business
owners, and community representatives standing in opposition to the creation of a
separate city. The One Boston Campaign was formed specifically to lobby against
the secession question. Led primarily by Black clergy loyal to Flynn, One Boston
members included Rev. Charles Stith and Rev. Bruce Wall, among others. As
Kennedy and Tilly write, “The One Boston Campaign, the organized group
opposing Mandela, surfaced just about three weeks before the election, and was
described by the Globe as ‘made up largely of minority clergymen and business
and political leaders.’ Its two most visible spokespeople were Bruce Wall and
Charles Stith, two relatively young black ministers. Both had challenged Flynn on
racial issues in the past, and ironically Wall had even joined the call for a Roxbury
plebiscite on separation in 1985. Wall pronounced that ‘A number of us have
planted the seeds of opportunity over the last seven years or so, and we intend to
stay here,’ but also acknowledged that he had in the past used the separation
proposal as a source of leverage over Flynn. GRIP had botched the opportunities
for such leverage, he argued, by taking itself too seriously.” (Kennedy and Tilly,
1987, 23) In the pages of The Boston Globe, however, Wall opined, ''This fans
racism on all sides and is very self-defeating…We've been trying to work for racial
harmony and sow the seeds of opportunity for people of color in Boston, not go
back to ground zero.'' (Butterfield, New York Times, 1986)
Stith helped prepare an internal memo to Flynn that outlined the mayor’s
strategy against Mandela. That opposition raised multiple issues, and information
was disseminated mainly through the media outlets, raising the fears of residents—
especially the fear that taxes would go up and the new city would not be solvent.
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “City officials were not to be outdone in the rush to
denounce reincorporation for Roxbury. Rev. Bruce Wall, a critic of Mandela, told
a Phoenix reporter that he had never seen Mayor Flynn so angry over an issue. A
typical comment from Flynn was, ‘We should not slam the door on the future to
make up for the problems of the past.’ Flynn's administration released a report that
projected Mandela would run an annual deficit of over $135 million. In the month
before the election, city workers were instructed to assume any inquiries about
Roxbury (e.g., about assessments and land disposition) were coming from Mandela
supporters and they were to withhold information until after the election. Flynn's
political organization was mobilized to stop Mandela at the polls; city workers
were seen at many polling places during working hours.” (Kennedy and Tilly,
1987, 23)
As State Representative Gloria Fox recalls:
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The people that worked for the mayor, there was a lot of people
from our community that worked for the mayor… anyone in the
community that [was] even thinking of Roxbury incorporation or
Mandela. And that was—it got very nasty and it—it polarized
our community and it’s not been repaired since then. It still has
an impact. We still remember who those people are, because they
later went on to work for another man, so on so forth. So it has
had a negative impact historically that still remains 30 years later.
One Boston didn’t mean one Boston at all; we refused to use the
term. It was so negative to those of us that were political in the
African American community that we shot it down; we shot the
term down as ONE Boston. (Fox, 2014)
A joint statement issued by Flynn, Stith, and Boston City Council
President Bruce Bolling Sr. titled, “Boston Reaffirms Unity Through
Rejection Of Question 9,” was issued on election night in 1986. It read:
The people of Boston have voted a resounding "no!" to
secession; They have rejected the divisiveness of the past and
have embraced Unity. The secession proposal was
counterproductive and polarizing in its attempt to divide Boston.
The people said no! As of tonight, secession and division are
issues of the past. As of tomorrow, we continue our joint efforts
to build strong families and strong neighborhoods in Boston. We
will continue to work to extend hope and opportunity to every
resident in every neighborhood. This has been our agenda
historically, as it is tonight and for the future. (Flynn, 1986)
The argument was made that Roxbury developers and construction projects would
also lose out on the linkage plans being offered at that time by Flynn. A typically
one-sided article in the Boston Globe warned, “Those with the most to lose, the
developers and construction people, stridently oppose secession. For them,
secession would destroy the linkage plans proposed by Mayor Flynn's
administration. Without being part of Boston, Roxbury developers would lose their
30 percent stake in a $400-million project that links the construction of a
downtown office building with a Roxbury commercial development.” (Boston
Globe, 1986) This was precisely the kind of gentrification that worried the
planners of Mandela. Linkage was seen by some to not necessarily be the best
thing for Roxbury. It demonstrates precisely how differently Blacks and Whites in
Boston, on more than one occasion, had a way of seeing any one issue much
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differently. The article continues, "Roxbury only recently has begun to attract
outside capital, where before the only outside capital it attracted was in the form of
government subsidies. Secession would put it even farther behind,” said John Cruz,
head of Cruz Construction, one of the city’s most successful minority construction
companies.
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “Black business owners interviewed by the
Globe complained that reincorporation had little to offer them. Richard Taylor,
president of the Minority Developers’ Association, stated, ‘I don't really believe
much of the basis of the Mandela proposal is grounded in trying to solve business
problems. I think its root is based in trying to gain political self-determination....
There has been no discussion on how it will affect the overall business climate.’
Some businessmen stood to lose directly—for example, the minority developers
who have a piece of Flynn's $400 million deal. John Cruz, a minority contractor
who is part of that deal, observed, "Roxbury only recently has begun to attract
outside capital .... Secession would put it even farther behind." (Kennedy and Tilly,
1987, 24)
Royal Bolling Sr., another opponent of the movement, cited as real examples
of progress his own election to the state Senate earlier in the year and the
appointment of a Black superintendent to oversee the Boston Public Schools the
year before, Laval S. Wilson. Bolling Sr. stated: ''The irony of Mandela is that we
are finally beginning to make progress towards empowerment within the
mainstream.'' (Butterfield, New York Times, 1986)
According to Kennedy and Tilly, then Black state senate candidate Bill
Owens told a Globe columnist that while he "philosophically" supported the
reincorporation and would vote for it, "I'm not encouraging people to vote for it
because I don't have all the information." (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 24)
Thomas Finneran, a state representative from Mattapan at that time and
future speaker of the Massachusetts House, whose constituents were 75 percent
Black due to re-districting, pointed out that there was certainly a backlash to the
idea in his neighborhood, stating: ''There is no question the backlash is there, there
are extremists in the white community just as there are in the black community.''
He continued, ‘‘there are white people saying, 'You've been a drain on us for
years—we'd be glad to get rid of the obligation.' '' Mr. Finneran added, ''They say,
'You're the only ones using the schools anyway, so you can have them,' '' referring
to the fact that 73 percent of Boston's public school students were members of
minority groups. (New York Times, 1986)
Nelson, author of Black Atlantic Politics, concluded, “With opposition
across the city building like a brush fire, the Mandela proposal had little chance of
victory at the ballot box…” In explaining the problems underlying the secession
movement, he noted, “The campaign for Mandela never really got off the ground
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in the Black community because Jones and Davis were political neophytes with no
experience in community organizing. This problem was compounded by the fact
that they had no constituency and were not connected to any existing communitybased organization capable of creating a constituency for them.” (Nelson, 2000,
19) While Davis and Jones may not have had the acumen, residents had a need to
feel like they had a stake in community control—to rid their community of drugs,
to save their young people from the crack cocaine epidemic taking hold. An
interview conducted with a Mandela supporter was telling in this regard:
If we had our own community, we wouldn't have drugs
coming in here. We could stop that cold. I wouldn't have
kids telling me what caliber rifle bullet they want. What
the hell do they know about rifles? The mayor conned
them; they get these house Negroes right out front. The
area [Mandela] wasn't all Black. They said we were too
poor to control our community. You had Harvard
Medical School. You had the University of
Massachusetts. You had Northeastern University
and the New England School of Fine Arts. All kind of
things. Anytime you don't have to put in sidewalks, storm
drains, electrical wiring, build schools, you are pretty rich
aren't you. This is the "Common Wealth" and it is one of
the oldest and richest parts of the country. It's a constant
re-education of who and what we are. There is a lot of
leadership here to do what needs to be done to give us
community control. (Nelson, 2000, 130)
There were many nuances to the Mandela debate that often get lost. The
interviewee mentions four tax-exempt institutions—he may have meant the New
England Conservatory of Music or Massachusetts College of Art and Design,
instead of the “New England School of Fine Arts”—that bring up several
important questions. What would have been the value of the residential and
commercial tax bases of Mandela? What would have been the number and size of
businesses there or the number of jobs?
A Los Angeles Times article, "Separatist City of Mandela: Boston Voting on
Proposal to Let Black Areas Secede," stated:
A study commissioned by Mayor Flynn and released in
early October showed that Mandela would face a $135million deficit in its first year. The study said also that
Mandela would have to raise residential property taxes
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by 61% and commercial and industrial property taxes by
44% to compensate for its reduced tax base. But Mandela
supporters dismiss the study's figures as deliberately
misleading. (Los Angeles Times, November 1, 1986)
Another Los Angeles Times article, from September 7, 1986, "Irate Blacks Pushing
for Secession in Boston," reported: “The secessionists argue that Mandela, despite
having the city's highest crime rates and lowest incomes, would nonetheless have
good prospects because of a solid tax base and its potential for business expansion.
The Boston Globe quoted city fiscal officers as saying that a breakaway Roxbury,
even with state aid, would face a $100-million budget deficit." (Los Angeles Times,
September 7, 1986)
The city’s estimate of Mandela’s fiscal prospects is contained in the
following memo to Raymond Dooley, the administrative services director in
charge of the budget and Flynn’s former campaign manager:
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Davis responded to this criticism by pointing out:
There are two issues that we had that were extremely powerful
elements for the economic side of incorporation. One was cityowned property. If one were to go through an incorporation
process, all of the municipal assets, not just assets in Roxbury,
but all of the municipal assets for this to be in Boston would
have to be reviewed because of the nature of the bond rating.
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That was an issue that was not discussed. It didn’t—the city
was terrified that that would be put forward because of the
potential impact on the city bond rating. So from a municipal
finance point of view, it was way in position to just look at tax
revenues in and out of our expenses. But if there was an
effort—we forced the city to be explicit about how much
money they were spending in Roxbury districts on municipal
services. But then people were always pissing and moaning
about, oh, the city doesn’t spend enough money in our
community. Well, we said, well, I think they might spend a lot.
But let’s press them to do that. And so by putting out our report
on the fiscal health of the community, it forced the city to be
explicit about that. And that raised some questions.
(Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015)
Some of the briefing notes prepared for Flynn by his handlers also allow us
to better understand the level of opposition to Mandela. These were the major
talking points of the “One Boston” campaign. It could just as easily be called
Flynn’s “I am a Bostonian” speech:
I am unalterably opposed to popularizing the Roxbury
secession concept in any way, as I would oppose considering
the separation of any neighborhood from the City. This means
that I am against considering neighborhood secession as a ballot
question in any form or as legislation of any sort. The
proposition is the exact opposite of the program I am pursuing
as mayor. It is divisive. It pits neighborhood against
neighborhood, race against race, and city resident against city
resident. As a political leader I offer one theme more often than
any other. As Boston residents, there is more power to be
realized by confronting the economic challenges we share than
by dwelling on the fears and misunderstandings which divide
us. The secession question is divisive and wrong headed. As
mayor, I am striving to unite Boston residents in a common
struggle against poverty, in a common crusade for better
neighborhood services and development. I am striving to ensure
that the benefits of downtown economic growth are shared
equitably with all the neighborhoods of Boston. It is absurd to
even suggest that any Boston neighborhood would fare better
economically as a separate city. Tax classification has created a
real return for Boston neighborhoods in terms of lower property
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taxes and improving services. Linkage and Boston Jobs
agreements offer new hope for those who have been
traditionally left behind during periods of economic growth. It
is folly to even consider surrendering these gains after years of
shared struggle. I am a Bostonian. That word—Bostonian—
feels a bit new to me. It is not a word many of us are
accustomed to saying. Perhaps that should change. I am proud
of my neighborhood, but I also am very proud of my city. I am
proud of both our diversity and our unity. I will surrender
neither. I am a Bostonian. (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky
and Tomás González, 1986)
Internal memos commissioned by the Flynn administration revealed : “Over
35% of the $799 million capital plan is earmarked for Mandela: This includes $6.9
million in new police stations, $191 million to improve health care facilities
(including a new BCH in-patient facility), $17 million to upgrade school facilities,
and $15 million to improve parks.” (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky and Tomás
González, 1986) To combat the supporters of Mandela, Flynn commissioned a
study of why secession would not work. The following figures illustrate his
position:
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Figure 1
Source: City of Boston Archives

Figure 2
Source: City of Boston Archives
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Figure 3
Source: City of Boston Archives
Along with Jones and Davis, Turner was a primary driver during the second attempt to pass
Mandela. Turner declared in a televised interview: “If we vote yes, this will be a mandate
for the mayor to open the books of the city. The BRA [Boston Redevelopment Authority]
says that there are 2,500 parcels of cleared land in District Seven alone, in Bruce Bolling’s
[city council] district alone. That’s 15 million square feet of land; you know what 15 million
square feet of cleared land is? That’s 300 football fields.” (WGBH, 1988)

In an interview, Turner recalled the following: “Economic implications were, you
know, were also a strong driving force in terms of creating a new city, with job
opportunities to the taking over of services that have been provided by the City of
Boston. At that time, one of the things that [was] a major driving force throughout
the city was the gentrification of that particular period and the fact that the
Roxbury-Dorchester area had the most, you know, land in the city. I think the
figure we used was ten football fields of available land for development.” (Turner,
2016)
When discussing this second campaign, many observers mention that the
second effort came closer than the first, but that point is misleading if you are not
looking at the overall ballots for each contest. There are several reasons for the
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large drop-off in interest, not the least of which was the formation of the Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative.
Figure 4
Overall Vote for the Mandela Referendum in 1986 and 1988
1986
(141 precincts)
1988
(97 precincts)
Yes
No
Blank
Total

Yes
No
Blank
Total

12,110
35,273
14,205
61,588

(20%)
(57%)
(23%)

11,643
(22%)
21,262
(40%)
19,659
(37%)
52,559
Figure 5
Comparison of Vote for Mandela Referendum in 1986 and 1988
in Precincts Unchanged by 1987 Redistricting
1986
(95 precincts)
1988
(95 precincts)
7,000
20,939
7,778
35,717

(20%)
(59%)
(22%)

11,216
20,298
18,941
50,455*

(22%)
(40%)
(38%)

Source: Boston Election Commission, 1986 and 1988.
*1988 was a presidential election.

As State Representative Byron Rushing, a key voice in the Mandela struggle
and a legislator who helped advise the process, recalls about the second
referendum: “So the next thing that we wanted to do after we lost having the vote,
then the last thing that we asked for was essentially a committee to be set up to
determine the practicality of doing all of this. And the court said that the
legislature could not do that because of our home-rule articles in our Constitution.
And that could only happen if Boston asks for that…I still come back to the fact
that I think that the—in terms of a critique, the biggest failure of this was not being
able to have this—have a strong clearly organizing piece to this. And so, all the
eggs had to go into this one basket and which was letting—having the legislature
make this decision.” (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky and Tomás González,
2016)
As the Boston Globe reported, “In a complaint filed with the court, the
committee's lawyers contend that Robert MacQueen, clerk of the House of
Representatives, wrongly interpreted an amendment to the state Constitution that
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the incorporation committee said should allow the Mandela question to be put
before the Legislature and included as a nonbinding referendum question in
November during Boston's municipal election. According to the complaint, Rep.
Byron Rushing (D-South End) sought to file a bill in the Legislature to put the
Mandela question on the ballot but was told by MacQueen that as a home-rule
petition the bill needed the support of the Boston City Council and Boston's
mayor.” (Winston, Boston Globe, June 17, 1987)
As Rushing recalls it, “We actually, went to the SJC about this because—
and the SJC said, “No, you can’t vote to have a discussion about this. This is yes
or no. You need to have to set up the town or city or not…” (Interview with
Zebulon Miletsky and Tomás González, 2016)
The Globe article continued, “According to Alan J. Rom, an attorney for
GRIP, the state Constitution provides that home-rule petitions can come before the
Legislature without City Council approval in cases of incorporation, annexation or
de-annexation… No further administrative remedies exist which the plaintiffs
might exhaust in order to obtain a determination of their present rights, status and
legal relationship, Rom said in the complaint. So GRIP has now asked the court to
decide the question and have MacQueen turn the bill over to a legislative
committee so that it may go through the process for inclusion on November's
ballot.” (Winston, Boston Globe, June 17, 1987)
Ultimately they were successful in getting the referendum back on the ballot
in 1988. As Rushing points out, however, the ultimate failure of the Mandela
initiative had to do with a lack of solid organizing. He explains, “If you have a
group of 500 people who are a part of this, you know, organizing, you would then
go and put the pressure on the City Council to do this because the City Council
could’ve done this. The City Council could do it right now.” (Rushing, 2016) In
the final analysis, the state Legislature was severely limited in what it could do, but
it could put up these nonbinding referendums to make a statement, and perhaps
pursue the matter from there. The problem is that neither referendum passed.
Without the organizing structure to carry on the issue, the dream of Mandela died.
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Figure 6

“Take a Stand, Own the Land”: The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative
In response to the Mandela movement, a local group, the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), proposed an alternate and more moderate plan
that did receive support from the community and Mayor Flynn. It is our contention
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that the City of Boston gave the nonprofit organization control of the Dudley
Square Triangle and created its land trust in response to the Mandela movement.
The transfer was mainly made, however, because DSNI had a grassroots
groundswell of organizing and investments from private foundations. Also, at least
two years of solid organizing and community revitalization through cleanups led
by DSNI convinced the city that this was an exceptionally viable program and
initiative. And that’s exactly what DSNI got—control over the land, over the
planning, over the development process. The most significant difference in these
two undertakings was that Mandela did not have a groundswell of Roxbury
residents participating in the planning and in the process, or an effective organizing
program on the ground.
There is much evidence to suggest that the defeat of Mandela was the
impetus behind the city’s willingness to get rid of this land. Indeed, there were
many factors and parallels between the Mandela movement and DSNI because the
former’s aspirational goal was community control. As historians have often
pointed out with regard to the epic struggles waged during the civil rights
movement, having both Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X was what made the
nonviolent movement successful due to the fact that Malcolm X’s program
represented such a drastic solution. Ossie Davis recalls in Voices of Freedom: An
Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s Through the 1980s,
by Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, “[Malcolm] was blunt where King was
tactful. They were both smart, both extraordinarily eloquent and articulate. He
could say the anger, while King could do the softer encouraging, persuasion,
pushing, prodding. Malcolm was a reinforcing person and responded to a different
need in us. It was always hard to try to
be half as good as Dr. King. Even though we believed in nonviolence, it was also
very good to have somebody vent the other side. There always need to be multiple
voices with multiple strategies pursuing social change.” (Hampton and Fayer,
1990, 250) In this case, Mandela was Malcolm X and DSNI was Martin Luther
King, Jr.
In 1987, the city agreed to create the land trust. Prior to the creation of
DSNI, the city laid out what it thought would be the comprehensive revitalization
of the Dudley Square neighborhood. Flynn’s administration had plans for Dudley
Square, but they did not include a community-led process. At the same time that
Mandela was being proposed, other grassroots initiatives were also asking the city
to participate in their process (and not the other way around, which was more
traditional), giving credence to the very paternalistic view of city government those
community organizers were expressing.
As the authors of Streets of Hope, a history of DSNI, point out, “Some
people linked the Flynn administration’s support of DSNI’s eminent domain to city
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opposition to the movement to have Greater Roxbury secede from Boston and
reincorporate as a separate city named Mandela. … Some Mandela organizers
claimed that DSNI’s eminent domain application was nothing more than a way to
sabotage the reincorporation process and provide Flynn with a bone to throw
Roxbury.” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 131)
Andrew Jones, interviewed in the Bay State Banner shortly before the BRA
hearings on granting eminent domain to DSNI, remarked, "This is the twilight
zone. It's getting bizarre. It's a purely political move and it's tied to incorporation.
It makes no sense at all for any city government to give that power to a private
agency….The people in this community have to watch themselves because the city
is trying to head off the biggest takeover of all, of 12.5 square miles of Boston,
Mandela." (Havis, 1988)
One of the main aspects in which Mandela differed from DSNI was the fact
that there was a comprehensive plan in place and collaboration among human
service agencies that together enabled DSNI to obtain resources. The financial
investment showed community residents they would benefit overall. By the end of
1992, the Riley Foundation had put $3.2 million of direct funding into DSNI.
Today, when you walk the Dudley Street area, it looks nothing like it did in
1986. At that time, homes were vacant and empty lots reigned. Today, there is
evident development. Because of the DSNI, the collaboration, and all of the hard
work, a stable community has emerged.
“We Want Our Own Neighborhood Development Authority”
The Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority (GRNA) was created in
February 1985. It was a direct outgrowth of King’s 1983 mayoral campaign and
an effort to make good on some of the promises of that campaign to give the Black
community control over the disposition of city-owned land. As Medoff and Sklar
make clear, DSNI's general approach and partnership with the city often contrasted
starkly with the city's response to the Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority
(GRNA), which was greeted with much more skepticism. As they write, “GRNA
was launched in January 1985 with the leadership of former mayoral candidate
Mel King and longtime Roxbury activists in movements for Black empowerment,
economic justice, and community development, including Turner, Ken Wade,
Willie Jones, and Bob Terrell. The week before the first GRNA meeting was
scheduled to take place, the BRA's Dudley Square Plan was leaked to the press.
When the GRNA held its first press conference, on February 14—Frederick
Douglass Day—it called for a moratorium on the disposition of city-owned land in
Roxbury until a ‘neighborhood authority’ was established "to review, monitor and
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exercise some degree of control over development in the area.” (Medoff and Sklar,
1994, 92)
As Turner recalls, the GRNA felt “the community should have a body that
could play the same role as the BRA in terms of the disciplining, you know, the
criteria and process for the decision making around the land. And there, other than
that, there were two initiatives that were launched as tools in that process of
determination. One was a suit, a Ten Taxpayer suit that the GRNA, which is
Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Authority, launched with the help of a couple of
the professors in the Law Department at UMass Boston, where we challenged the
city on the fact that there hadn’t been a development plan in about 25 or 30 years,
and basically took the position in court that they, you know, couldn’t, they didn’t
have the legal right to move forward with the dispossession of the land in the
community without a new development plan which caused, we think, a serious
amount of concern…in this city and eventually led to them setting up a process to
develop a new master plan to offset our suit.” (Turner, 2016)
Not only was there a definite connection between GRNA and Mandela, it
would be accurate to say that GRNA and Mandela worked in tandem. As Turner
recalls:
They actually took the concepts that we were working with and
took them to a higher level, and so there were numbers within
GRNA neighborhood council who felt that the presence of the
initiative…was very helpful in terms of putting pressure on Flynn
to be willing to negotiate with us since, you know, we were less of
a threat to his authority and power than Mandela. And you know
my perspective is that’s in fact [what] led to his saying, well, I can’t
win. When it was clear that he couldn’t put an independent group, a
group independent of our neighborhood council, in place, he said,
well…I’m establishing neighborhood councils in a number of areas
and, in that context, you know, put his stamp of support on the, on
the Roxbury Neighborhood Council as a group that they would
work with and eventually, you know, that neighborhood council
was written into the Article 50 in the Zoning Code and…the council
was given to make decision to be the voice of the community in
relationship to land development issues, not having the power,
decision making power, but having the power to hold hearings and
to make recommendations, be the group that had the authority
within the Zoning Code to make recommendations to the city and to
hold hearings on the issues of zoning appeals and zoning practices.
And so when, you know, I think that the Mandela initiative was—
the existence of the Mandela initiative was the key leverage in
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terms of the mayor being willing to acknowledge the neighborhood
council and have the BRA work with us. (Interview with Zebulon
Miletsky and Tomás González, 2016)
On the other hand, as Sklar and Medoff suggest, “The Greater Roxbury
Neighborhood Authority (GRNA) only decided to support the referendum as “a
tactical matter.” As member Ken Wade explains in an interview with the authors,
“We were not sold on the notion that the major strategy for empowerment should
be the creation of a separate city for, principally, people of color. We thought, as a
tactical matter, it helped to surface the disparity in terms of service delivery. It
helped to provide an organizing tool to get people talking, meeting, and in motion
around something. If nothing else, our perspective in the GRNA was that you
would have to have this study that would reveal how the city is shortchanging that
community." (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132).
The other legacy of Mandela and GRNA’s efforts was the creation of the
Roxbury Neighborhood Council (RNC). In 1984, the Office of Neighborhood
Services proposed five neighborhood councils in Roxbury, West Roxbury,
Dorchester, Chinatown, and Jamaica Plain. Flynn appointed eight people as
interim council members to the nascent Roxbury Neighborhood Council, all of
whom were members of GRNA. They were charged with conducting an election
for the purpose of staffing a fifteen-member council whose role was to advise in
the future development and the disposal of city-owned land. As the Banner article
explains, the city approached the GRNA about becoming the council for the
neighborhood of Roxbury: “The Flynn administration recognized the Roxbury
group as the official council for the neighborhood. Like the other neighborhood
councils, the RNC was given advisory authority, not the power that activists had
sought to approve or kill projects. In their heyday of the 1980s and early '90s, the
neighborhood councils held annual elections in which residents were elected both
at-large and from districts within their areas.” (Banner, 2015)
As the Banner further explained, the main sticking point between the newly
founded GRNA and the Flynn administration was the question of veto power to
approve or reject projects within Roxbury. “The Roxbury Neighborhood Council
was originally established in 1986, an outgrowth of the Greater Roxbury
Neighborhood Authority, a community organization that sought community
control over development in Roxbury.” (Banner, 2015) The article continued,
“The push for neighborhood councils in Boston mirrored a national trend toward
greater community control. Neighborhood councils in cities like New York were
given real veto power over development projects. In the 1983 city election, the
organizing group Mass Fair Share placed a nonbinding referendum on the ballot
calling for the establishment of neighborhood councils with veto power. The
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measure passed by a two-to-one margin.” (Banner, 2015) Many members of the
Flynn administration, including his Chief of Staff Neil Sullivan, were former
organizers with Mass Fair Share and had done much important work organizing on
the basis of class.
In a letter to the newly appointed members of the Roxbury Neighborhood
Council dated June 12, 1986, Flynn wrote, “I am seeking to establish an
unprecedented level of community involvement in development planning and
neighborhood service delivery. At the same time, I am seeking to balance the
process rights of each individual neighborhood with my responsibility as Mayor of
the City as a Whole.” He added, “As in every neighborhood, this administration
has two fundamental responsibilities in reference to development in Roxbury: We
are responsible for doing all that we can to foster redevelopment that benefits the
poor and working families and the businesses in the area; and are responsible for
involving the community in a meaningful way in the decision-making process.” At
the same time, he wanted to balance the power of the councils with the mayor and
city as a whole, and this led to many disagreements between the RNC—which
wanted a higher degree of control—and the city. Flynn clarified his position on the
matter. “At no time, either as Mayor or as a mayoral candidate, have I favored
granting veto power within the development process to any neighborhood council
or development advisory committee fulfilling the recent BRA Board vote; it
became clear to me that the ‘approval rights’ members of the committee were
seeking other development uses for publicly held land that might allow one
neighborhood to block a proposal without further recourse for the Mayor as the
elected representative of all city residents. I find this an unacceptable level of veto
power.” (Flynn, 1986)
The Roxbury Neighborhood Council's role is outlined in the Zoning Code,
BRA Article 50, as being “to promote the public safety, health and welfare of the
people of Roxbury, within the boundaries as defined by the zoning commission of
the City of Boston and to promote and expand neighborhood economic
development by working with the city, state, other neighborhood agencies and
individuals to identify, promote and create new jobs and business opportunities for
the Roxbury neighborhood.” (BRA Zoning Code, BRA Article 50) 7
Turner further observes: “The legacy of the Mandela movement was that the
issue was to have the community having an authoritative voice in that process, and
so at the end of the master planning process there was the development of a
governing group called the ‘Roxbury Strategic Master Plan Oversight Committee’
http://www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/getattachment/94daf533-0516-454e8a8f-857c3b19024f
7
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that…was appointed by the Mayor and had the authority to make recommendations
to the BRA in terms…developers of particular parcels of land…to the BRA, the
larger parcels, particularly in the Dudley Square area.” (Turner, 2016)
But again, as Streets of Hope notes, not all of the leadership of GRNA
agreed about Mandela, as GRNA co-chair Bob Terrell explained: "It doesn't make
sense to have a separate city that's just as underdeveloped as the neighborhood
already is underdeveloped ... The shift in the geopolitical definition wouldn't solve
our underlying economic problems." (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132). As Kennedy
and Tilly write, “Leaders like Mel King and State Representative Byron Rushing,
who had supported and in some cases helped to initiate earlier proposals for a
separate Roxbury, quickly supported GRIP. Grassroots groups such as the Greater
Roxbury Neighborhood Authority hesitated longer, put off by GRIP's singleminded and sometimes sectarian insistence that incorporation was the only way to
solve Roxbury's problems. But the GRNA, as well as progressive multiracial
groups such as the Rainbow Coalition (a spinoff of Mel King's 1983 mayoral
campaign), eventually endorsed the Mandela referendum as one strategy for
community control and self-determination.” (Kennedy and Tilly, 1987, 24)
Interestingly, Medoff and Sklar report: “The DSNI board voted not to take a
position on the referendum. Board members could be found on both sides. The
Mandela issue never came up in DSNI's discussions with city officials. City
officials say they never linked Mandela and DSNI in their own deliberations about
eminent domain.” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132) Finally, BRA planner Andrea
D’Amato, also quoted, says “Mandela was much more of an issue outside the
[BRA] than it ever was internally…The BRA or PFD [Public Facilities
Department] commitment, to the best of my understanding, was never a response
to Mandela. It was never a way of satisfying Mandela in a different way… It was
just a weird twist of timing.” (Medoff and Sklar, 1994, 132)
Davis offered a different opinion: “I leaned into the foundations to support
the DSNI. The whole white campaign, there was a whole effort on garbage
being—there was a whole kind of phenomenon of garbage on vacant lots. And
you know, [it] just pushed the community to start claiming those lots and, in return,
push[ed] the city to actually put white picket fences around the lot to make visible
the issue.” (Interview with Zebulon Miletsky, 2015) Davis continues, “The one
thing that we were very—I was personally very pleased with, was DSNI—if I look
back historically, and I say, well, what am I happy about, what made it worth it?
DSNI made it worth it. Because they’ve been able to influence community
organizing all around the country, all around the world, really.” (Interview with
Zebulon Miletsky, 2015)
Rushing, a state representative from the nearby South End, also sees some
correlation. Speaking of DSNI specifically, he said, “We’re influenced with that
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geographic look, and looking at ways then to do that kind of organizing
approaching a neighborhood that way, without risking losing the support from the
power structure because you insist on independence. So, rather than insisting on
having your own mayor, you say, ‘Oh no, we want to just have control over…all
the land the city owns at my neighborhood.’ We—you can't do anything to that
land without coming to the neighbors, right? …That kind of approach, I think, was
definitely influenced with this idea.” (Interview with Jeremy Bingham, 2014)
As Kennedy and Tilly write, “In fact, the GRNA has been active in pulling
together a citywide Coalition for Community Control, which links together
neighborhoods across the city in demanding greater community authority over
development. Boston's powers-that-be tried to use the Mandela referendum to
discredit the GRNA and other black groups and leaders that seek to pursue a
community control strategy. We believe that instead, the debate over incorporation
is likely to give new visibility and a political boost to that strategy.” (Kennedy and
Tilly, 1994, 25)
Gloria Fox, the longtime Roxbury state representative, sums up the quandary
well: “So, there were a lot of things that would have turned out differently in the 30
years that has gone on since we brought this innovative idea of self-governance,
self-determination, kujichagulia, and the ability to determine your life... That was
brought to the people and no matter how they looked upon it, hindsight is 20/20,
the same things that people are complaining about now they could have been,
maybe not completely washed away, but they could have been dealt with by the
organizers and the community and themselves now.” (Interview with Jeremy
Bingham, 2014)
Conclusion
Tilly and Kennedy make an important point in their article on Mandela that
Roxbury was both a neighborhood and a commodity, which is a helpful framework
for understanding the discrepancy between the differing visions of the city and
mayor and the community. They write, “Roxbury can be analyzed in two ways,
both of which are important to an understanding of its unique role in the current
transformation of Boston. It is a neighborhood, meaning that it has a particular
location, is made up of buildings and other supporting structures, and occupies a
piece of land. It is also a community, specifically a Black and Latino community,
which means that it has a social and political as well as a physical reality. As a
neighborhood, Roxbury is a commodity, or rather a collection of commodities. Its
land and buildings are bought and sold on the market for profit. As a commodity, a
neighborhood goes through cycles in which it is developed, decays, and is rebuilt,
cycles that occur in the context of cycles of accumulation for the city and the
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economy as a whole.” (Gastón, Kennedy, and Tilly, 1990, 99) This framework of
“community” versus “commodity” tells us something about how much there was at
stake for the city and neighborhood stakeholders. While residents fought to control
their physical space and improve their quality of life in the form of Mandela, the
city was more concerned with revenue and quieting the more radical political
elements calling for a separate municipality. As “communities,” these areas were
significant to those who lived there; however, in this moment as “commodities,”
they were of little value and ripe for redevelopment.
A short stroll around the areas of Roxbury today tells that story. Properties
estimated to be worth well over a million dollars exist in what was once
dismissively labeled “the ghetto.” Prior to this moment, however, Black residents
and activists attempted to fight to protect their neighborhood from gentrification.
Groups such as Freeze Frame in Roxbury continue to carry the torch for
community control over the land for the people of Roxbury. Although there has
been talk of reinvigorating the Roxbury Neighborhood Council, it remains a
defunct organization. As part of his Imagine 2030 initiative, current Boston mayor
Marty Walsh has expressed interest in possibly rebuilding the council. Groups
such as “Reclaim Roxbury” have been holding meetings about possibly reinstating
the GRNA. While Mandela, as an autonomous Black-majority city, did not come
to fruition, the ideas behind it sparked a shift in discussions about community
control. In the wake of national changes, including deindustrialization and a rising
population of urban unemployed people, local politicians and their constituents
were propelled to come up with solutions to new problems. If it had succeeded,
Mandela would have served as a model for self-determination as understood by
those influenced by the movements of the 1960s. Instead, in the failure of the
referenda, Flynn, DSNI, and to a certain degree the residents of Roxbury were able
to construct a new vision for the future of this community. While one can debate
whether or not this vision benefited the residents of Roxbury, it is clear that
“Mandela” pushed the debate about community control forward on a more
progressive path.
In the final analysis, Mandela suffered most from a lack of organizing
experience on the part of its founders, Andrew Jones and Curtis Davis. King, in an
unpublished paper written after the first vote on Mandela, argued, "Transformation
starts with the belief that we can fashion a community that is free of the
oppressive, elitist dominance that currently characterizes the relationships in this
country.... Our first step is to define the community and the direction in which it
would proceed. Everything being suggested here are things we have already done
... I am convinced that failure to organize at this level will mean that we are moved
off this turf." (Neill, 1990)
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